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This paper studies passengers’ choice behavior in air travel. Products are deﬁned
as a unique combination of airline and ﬂight itinerary while markets are deﬁned
as a directional round-trip air travel between an origin and a destination city.
A structural econometric model is used to investigate the relative importance
of price (airfare) and non-price product characteristics in explaining passengers’
choice of these diﬀerentiated products. The results suggest that, on average,
prices may not be as important as we think in explaining passengers’ choice
behavior among alternative products. Non-price characteristics, which may
include convenience of ﬂight schedules, frequent ﬂyer programs, the quality of in-
ﬂight service, among other things, seem to be much more important in explaining
passengers’ choice behavior. As such, the results have implications for the focus
of antitrust policies in the airline industry when assessing the impact of mergers,
alliances, or other business decisions of airlines.
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Probably two of the most important developments in the U.S. airline industry follow-
ing deregulation in 1978, were the airlines’ move to hub-and-spoke networks and their
increased sophistication in pricing and marketing their products [Borenstien(2004)].
The hub-and-spoke network has the eﬀect of increasing the dominance of a few air-
lines in markets where these airlines have hubs in big cities [see Borenstein (1992)]. A
hub network allows airlines to oﬀer change-of-plane service between airports for which
the hub is a convenient intermediate stop. As such, strategically establishing hubs
in various cities constitutes one aspect of non-price competition that exists between
airlines. Sophistication in marketing practices such as frequent ﬂyer programs and
travel agent commission override programs1 are other examples of non-price aspects
of competition that serves to increase an airline’s dominance.
Despite the numerous non-price aspects of competition among airlines, the focus
of policy makers is often on the potential price eﬀects that various business decisions
of airlines may have. Examples of airline business decisions that often concern policy
makers include mergers and code share alliances among airlines. One of the main
objectives of this paper is to emphasize the importance of controlling for the non-price
aspects of competition among airlines’ when assessing the price eﬀects of business
strategies of these airlines. In fact, the relative importance that policy makers place
on the price eﬀects of proposed or actual business strategies of airlines may even be
in question.
It is well known that in industries where products are not homogenous, compe-
tition among ﬁrms is not restricted to price.2 In fact, the non-price characteristics
of products may be just as important as price, if not more so, in explaining con-
sumers’ choice of particular products. As suggested above, the airline industry is
1Frequent ﬂyer programs normally involve passengers’ ability to use accumulated miles traveled
on an airline to qualify for discounts on tickets while travel agent commission override programs
involve arrangements where agents are rewarded for directing a high proportion of their bookings to
the airline.
2See the chapter on product diﬀerentiation in Tirole (1988). In the tenth printing of the text,
the relevant discussion is found in chapter 7.
1one example of a diﬀerentiated product industry where ﬁrms compete on various
non-price characteristics of the products oﬀered. For example, in addition to the fre-
quent ﬂyer programs and the travel agent commission override programs mentioned
above, airlines may oﬀer multiple itineraries3 within a given market, and various pro-
motional activities4 designed to steal customers from competitors. A frequent ﬂyer
program is an example of loyalty-inducing marketing device that is intended to reduce
consumer’s sensitivity to price. Empirical studies by Nako (1992), Proussaloglou and
Koppelman (1995), and Suzuki et al. (2003) have shown that frequent ﬂyer programs
signiﬁcantly aﬀect travelers’ choice of airlines. In the face of the non-price product
characteristics that may inﬂuence consumers’ choice of a product, which then drives
the multidimensional nature of competition in the airline industry, one may wonder
how important price is as a strategic variable for airlines.
Knowing potential passengers’ relative valuation of various product characteristics
must be at the heart of formulating eﬀective business strategies. Acquiring this
information is confounded by the fact that passengers are heterogeneous, that is,
each passenger is likely to have a diﬀerent valuation for each product characteristic.
As such, explicitly modeling potential passengers’ decision-making process is crucial
in any attempt to estimate the relative importance of price in the multidimensional
nature of competition between airlines. Thanks to recent advances in econometric
estimation of demand for diﬀerentiated products, [Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995)
popularly referred to as BLP, Berry(1994), Nevo(2000)] consumer heterogeneity can
explicitly be incorporated in a structural econometric model of consumer decision-
making process. To the best of my knowledge, except for Berry, Carnall, and Spiller
(1997) (henceforth BCS) and Berry (1990), there has not been any other attempt to
explicitly model passengers’ heterogeneity within a discrete choice econometric model
of demand for air travel. One crucial diﬀerence between the model in this paper and
the models in BCS and Berry (1990) is that here, consumers’ heterogeneity (variation
3Multiple times of departures and arrivals combined with variations in intermediate stops.
4Advanced purchase of tickets, stopover deals, etc.
2in taste) is allowed to vary with demographic information (such as income and age)
d r a w nf r o me a c hm a r k e t , 5 while in BCS, heterogeneity solely depends on an assumed
parametric distribution of taste.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The empirical model is presented
in section 2. There, I discuss how passengers’ heterogeneity is modeled, which has
implications for estimating the model. Section 3 discusses the estimation strategy
along with my identifying assumptions. I discuss characteristics of the data in section
4 and results are presented and discussed in section 5. Even though the analysis
in this paper focuses on a sample of U.S. domestic air travel markets, the research
methodology can easily be extended to international air travel. Concluding remarks
are made in section 6.
2 The Model.
In the model, a market is deﬁned as a directional round-trip air travel between an
origin and a destination city. The assumption that markets are directional implies
that a round-trip air travel from Atlanta to Dallas is a distinct market than round-
trip air travel from Dallas to Atlanta. This allows characteristics of origin city to
aﬀect demand [see BCS]. In what follows, markets are indexed by t .
A ﬂight itinerary is deﬁned as a speciﬁc sequence of airport stops in traveling
from the origin to destination city. Products are deﬁned as a unique combination of
airline and ﬂight itinerary.6 For example, three separate products are (1) a non-stop
round trip from Atlanta to Dallas on Delta Airlines, (2) a round trip from Atlanta to
Dallas with one stop in Albuquerque on Delta Airlines, and (3) a non-stop round trip
from Atlanta to Dallas on American Airlines. Note that all three products are in the
same market. The airline-speciﬁc component of the product deﬁnition is intended
5See Nevo(2000) for more on this approach.
6Even though it is possible to further distinguish products by using a unique combination of price,
airline, and ﬂight itinerary as in BCS, I chose to use only airline and ﬂight itinerary. The reason is
that observed product market shares, which I deﬁne subsequently, will be extremely small if products
are deﬁned too narrowly. The empirical model becomes diﬃcult to ﬁt when product market shares
are extremely small.
3to capture the fact that airlines diﬀer in the services they oﬀer. Airline services
may diﬀer along several dimensions. For example, frequent ﬂyer programs and the
quality of in-ﬂight service often diﬀer across airlines.
Let consumer i choose among J diﬀerent products oﬀered in market t by com-
peting airlines. The indirect utility that consumer i gets from consuming a product
in market t is given by
Uijt = dj + xjtβi − αipjt + 4ξjt + εijt (1)
where dj are product ﬁxed eﬀects capturing characteristics of the products that are
the same across markets, xjt is a vector of observed product characteristics, βi is a
vector of consumer taste parameters (assumed random) for diﬀerent product charac-
teristics, pjt is the price of product j , αi represents the marginal utility of price, 4ξjt
are diﬀerences in unobserved (by the econometrician) product characteristics since
dj is included in equation(1), and εijt represents the random component of utility
that is assumed independent and identically distributed across consumers, products
and markets. The product characteristics captured by dj may include, but not re-
stricted to, the quality of in-ﬂight service, and frequent ﬂyer programs oﬀered by each
airline. 4ξjt is deﬁned as diﬀerences in unobserved product characteristics because
4ξjt = ξjt−ξj, where ξjt represents unobserved product characteristics of product j
in market t, and ξj represents the portion of the unobserved product characteristics
of product j that is the same across all markets. By including dj in the model, I
have basically controlled for ξj [see Nevo(2000), Villas-Boas(2003)].7
Note that βi and αi are individual-speciﬁc, implying that consumers have diﬀer-
ent tastes for each product characteristic. For example, consumers may diﬀer on
their preference for a particular ﬂight itinerary which may involve multiple stops.
The diﬀerence in preference may depend on the consumers’ age, opportunity cost of
time (income), and other unobservable (by the econometrician) taste components.
Following Nevo(2000), I assume that individual characteristics consist of two com-
7dj is captured by a set of airline dummies. The implications of including these dummies in the
model will become clearer in the estimation section where I discuss instrumental variables.
4ponents: demographics, which I refer to as observed, and additional characteristics,
which I refer to as unobserved, denoted Di and νi respectively. As I discuss further
in the data section, the data used in the estimation does not have consumer level
information, which means that neither component of the individual characteristics
(Di or νi) is directly observed in the choice data set. As explained in Nevo (2000),
even though we may not observe individual data, we know something about the dis-
tribution of demographics in each market. However, we know nothing about the
distribution of νi, and must therefore make assumptions about its distribution as in
the famous BLP model.










+ ΓDi + Σvi (2)
where Di is a m-dimensional column vector of demographic variables, while vi is a
k-dimensional column vector that captures unobserved consumer characteristics, Γ
is a k × m matrix of parameters that measure how taste characteristics vary with
demographics, and Σ is a k × k diagonal matrix, where elements on the main diag-
onal are parameters. k corresponds to the number of random taste parameters (or





), while m corresponds to the number of
demographic variables. I assume that vi has a standard multivariate normal distrib-
ution, N (0,I ),w h i l eDi has an empirical distribution, b F(D), from the demographic







To complete the speciﬁcation of the demand system, I introduce an outside good
called good zero, allowing for the possibility that consumer i may not purchase one of
the J products considered in the empirical model. This implies that the outside good
may include alternatives to air travel to get from the origin city to the destination
8Demographic variables in Di are expressed in deviations from their respective means. Thus
the mean of each variable in Di is zero. Since the mean of vi is also a zero vector based on the










and its variance is equal to the
square of the elements on the main diagonal of Σ.
5city and back. These alternatives may include motor vehicle or train. As usual, the
mean utility level of the outside good, δ0t, is normalized to be a constant and equal
to zero, while the mean utility level of each of the J products, δjt,i sg i v e nb y
δjt = dj + xjtβ − αpjt + 4ξjt (3)
Let θ =( Γ,Σ) be a vector of non-linear parameters. Further, let
µijt(xjt,p jt,ν i,D i; θ)=[ −pjt,x jt](ΓDi + Σνi) (4)
Using equations (1) to (4) allows me to express the indirect utility from consuming
product j as
Uijt = δjt + µijt + εijt (5)
where µijt +εijt is a mean zero, heteroskedastic deviation from the mean utility that
captures the eﬀects of the random coeﬃcients.
I assume that consumers purchase one unit of the product that gives the highest
utility. Based on the above, the vector (νi,D i,ε i0t,...,ε iJt) describes the attributes
of a consumer. Formally, the set of individual attributes that lead to the choice of
product j can be written as
Ajt = {(νi,D i,ε i0t,...,ε iJt)|Uijt ≥ Uilt ∀l =0 ,1,...,J}
Thus Ajt represents the set of consumers who choose product j in market t.R e -
call that a product is deﬁned as an itinerary-airline combination. For example, if
product j is a round-trip from Atlanta to Dallas with one stop in Albuquerque on
Delta Airlines, then Ajt deﬁnes the set of consumers choosing this itinerary-airline
combination rather than any other itinerary-airline combination in the Atlanta to
Dallas market. Formally, I can deﬁne the predicted (by the model) market share of
product j as







dF (v)db F (D)dF (ε) (6)
6where F(·) denotes the population distribution functions and F (v,D,ε)=F (v) b F (D)F (ε)
is due to assumed independence of ν, D,a n dε. If we assume that both D and ν are
ﬁxed, thus implying that consumer heterogeneity enters only through the random
shock, and εijt is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with an extreme
value type I density, then equation (6) becomes













which is the standard multinomial logit model. If we relax the assumption that
both D and ν are ﬁxed, while still assuming that εijt is i.i.d. type I extreme value,
equation (6) becomes








Equation (8) corresponds to the random coeﬃcients (or mixed logit) model that I use
in this paper. As is well known in the empirical industrial organization literature,
there is no closed form solution for equation (8) and thus it must be approximated
numerically using random draws from b F(D) and F(ν).
Recall that sjt(xjt,p jt; α, β, θ) in equation (8) is the predicted market share of
product j and therefore is not observed. Given a market size of measure M, which I
assume to be the size of the population in the origin city, observed market shares of
product j in market t is Sjt=
qj
M,w h e r eqj is the actual number of travel tickets sold
for a particular itinerary-airline combination called product j. The observed market
share for each product is computed analogously. The estimation strategy involves
choosing values of α, β and θ to minimize the distance between the predicted, sjt,
and observed, Sjt, market shares.
3 Estimation.
I use Nevo’s (2000) simulation based Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) es-
timation algorithm. First, to numerically approximate equation (8), I took random
7draws from b F(D) and F(ν),w h e r eb F(D) is the empirical distribution of demographic
variables (income and age) in the origin city, and F(ν) is the multivariate standard
normal distribution. For example, a draw from b F(D) for one individual (individual i)
can be represented by the vector Di =( Di1,D i2)0, where Di1 is individual i0s income
and Di2 is individual i0s age. Similarly, a draw from F(ν) for the same individual
can be represented by the k-dimensional vector νi =( ν1
i ,...,νk
i )0 where each of the k
elements in νi represents individual i0s taste parameter for the corresponding product
characteristic. Let ns represent the number of individuals sampled in each market.



























Recall that δjt is a linear function in the parameters α and β (see equation(3)),
while θ =( Γ,Σ). As discussed above, the estimation strategy involves choosing
parameter values (b α, b β and b θ) that minimizes the distance between predicted and
observed product market shares. For a detailed description of the estimation algo-
rithm, see Nevo (2000). In searching for the global minimum of the GMM objective
function, I start by using the Newton method with an analytic gradient. I then
use the parameter values obtained from the Newton method as starting values in the
more robust Nelder-Mead (1965) simplex search method. Using both search methods
helps ensure that results are robust.
3.1 Instruments
If we assume that airlines take into account all the non-price characteristics (xjt and
4ξjt) of their products before setting prices, then prices will depend on 4ξjt. In other
words, components of 4ξjt such as convenient ﬂight schedules, various marketing and
promotional activities, all of which are market-speciﬁc and unobservable to me (but
observable to consumers and airlines), are likely to inﬂuence prices. Not having data
8on 4ξjt implies that it is part of the error term in the demand model. As such, the
estimated coeﬃcient on price will be inconsistent if appropriate instruments are not
found for prices. As is well known in econometrics, valid instruments must satisfy
two requirements. First, instruments must be uncorrelated with the residual, and
second, they must be correlated with the endogenous variable. In other words, valid
instruments must be uncorrelated with 4ξjt but correlated with pjt. Ie m p l o yt w o
sets of instruments in estimation which I describe below.
The ﬁrst set of instruments that I use is described and used in Nevo (2000) and ﬁrst
introduced by Hausman et al.(1994) and Hausman (1996). This set of instruments is
an attempt to exploit the panel structure of the data. Since I observe prices charged
by each airline in a cross section of markets, the identifying assumption made is that,
controlling for the component of the service that is constant across markets (embodied
in airline dummies), the market speciﬁc valuations of the products, 4ξjt = ξjt − ξj,
are independent across markets. This implies that 4ξjt is uncorrelated with prices
in markets other than market t. If we couple this with the idea that prices charged
by an airline across markets have a common cost component that may be speciﬁc
to the airline, then each airlines’ prices ought to be correlated across markets. The
upshot of these arguments is that prices charged by an airline in diﬀerent markets
can serve as instruments for each other. The common cost component in an airline’s
prices could result from providing a similar general quality of service across all the
markets it serves. Of course, prices are also inﬂuenced by market-speciﬁcf a c t o r s ,
such as the level of competition in a particular market, implying that in equilibrium,
an airline’s prices should not be identical across markets. In summary, I use average
prices charged by an airline in other markets to instrument for its prices in each
market.
The second set of instruments I use is described in Villas-Boas (2003). Since
input prices are marginal cost shifters, they are also valid instruments for prices of
ﬁnal products. The problem in using input prices as instruments in these discrete
choice models is that input prices do not vary across brands of the product, while
9ﬁnal goods prices vary across brands. For example, in applying the model to the
yogurt market [see Villas-Boas (2003)], the price of sugar, an input for yogurt, is the
same across all brands of yogurt. Similarly, in the case of the market for air travel,
the price per gallon of fuel is the same whether the product is a round trip non-stop
ﬂight from Atlanta to Dallas on Delta or a round trip non-stop ﬂight from Atlanta to
Dallas on American Airlines. Notwithstanding that input prices are the same across
brands of diﬀerentiated products, Villas-Boas argued that a change in input prices
may aﬀect diﬀerent brands in diﬀerent ways since brands may diﬀer in their relative
use of inputs. Thus Villas-Boas recommend using as instruments, the interaction
between input prices and brand dummies. This allows input prices to aﬀect the ﬁnal
price of each brand diﬀerently. Following Villas-Boas (2003), I use the interaction
of fuel prices with airline dummies as instruments for ﬁnal ticket prices. Similar to
Villas-Boas’s argument, the idea is that a change in fuel price may aﬀect each airline
diﬀerently, one reason being that airlines may oﬀer diﬀerent ﬂight itineraries in a
market that require diﬀerent amounts of fuel to service each itinerary. For example,
it is reasonable to assume that an itinerary for a non-stop ﬂight from Atlanta to
Dallas requires diﬀerent amounts of fuel compared to an itinerary from Atlanta to
Dallas with one stop in Albuquerque.
4D a t a .
Data on the airline industry is drawn from the Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B),
which is a 10% sample of airline tickets from reporting carriers. The U.S. Bureau
of Transportation Statistics publishes this database along with other transportation
data via its TranStats web site.9 The DB1B database includes such items as passen-
gers, fares, and distances for each directional market, as well as information about
whether the market was domestic or international. Distances ﬂo w nv a r yw i t h i na
market because itineraries may involve multiple connecting ﬂights to get from the
9For detail on air travel data published by U.S. Bureau of Transportation go to
http://transtats.bts.gov/
10origin to the destination city. A market may therefore comprise several distinct
routes or segments. As such, the data I use contains directional markets rather than
non-stop routes or segments of a market. For this research, I focus on the U.S.
domestic market in the ﬁrst quarter of 2002.
As an example, let me describe three distinct observations (products) actually
contained in the data set. One of the ﬁfteen round-trip markets considered is the
Atlanta to Dallas market. Three observations in this market are, (1) a non-stop ﬂight
on American Airlines, (2) a non-stop ﬂight on Delta Airlines, and (3) an itinerary
with one stop in Houston on Continental Airlines. Over the review period, 2273
passengers bought product (1) at an average price of $233.29.10 However, for the
said review period, 5572 passengers bought product (2) at an average price of $252.49.
The distance associated with products (1)a n d( 2 )i s7 3 2m i l e s . F o rp r o d u c t( 3 ) ,4 3
passengers bought this product over the review period at an average price of $163.10.
The distance associated with the third product is 913 miles, since passengers were
routed through Houston. For the three products described above, Atlanta is a hub
for Delta but not for American or Continental. There are two points worthy of
mention here, (1) the hub product (product 2) seems to be the most popular among
passengers even though it is relatively more expensive than the other two products,
(2) the product with one stop is signiﬁcantly cheaper than the non-stop products.
Summary statistics for the entire sample of air travel data are presented in table
1. The ﬁrst column lists the ﬁfteen markets considered, while the second column
gives the number of observations (products) in each market. In the third column, I
report the percentage of products in the sample for which the origin airport is a hub.
10Since each passenger may pay a diﬀerent price/fare for a given itinerary-airline combination for
various reasons (advanced purchase of ticket, weekend stay over days etc.), I use the average price
paid for a given itinerary-airline combination over the review period.
11Table 1 



























Atlanta – Dallas  111  33.33  278.74    0 785  1112.54  731 1870 
Atlanta - Newark  78 25.64  259.85  0  805  1107.03 745  1646 
Atlanta - Los Angeles  181 30.94  361.82  0  2101  2491.46 1946  4158 
Atlanta - Salt Lake City  160 35.00  333.92  0  1480  2271.18 1589  3763 
Cincinnati - Atlanta  57 24.56  299.20  5  651  687.44 373  1105 
Cincinnati - Los Angeles  62 32.26  291.75  0  1251  2349.42 1900  3383 
Cincinnati - Salt Lake City  90 34.44  337.36  0  1654  2068.91 1449  3175 
Dallas - Atlanta  137 31.39  303.92  0  1131  1179.53 731  1973 
Dallas - Cincinnati  57 29.82  357.62    0  1183  1373.18 812  2432 
Dallas - Newark  63 19.05  399.55  0  1622  1646.92 1372  2956 
Houston - Cleveland  76 19.74  252.14  0  1538  1441.79 1091  2442 
Houston - Newark  109 28.44  390.03  0  1280  1718.24 1400  3142 
Minneapolis - Atlanta    55 3.64  240.33  0  838  1364.84 906  2096 
Salt Lake City - Atlanta  151 31.13  364.26  0  1301  2293.79 1589  4684 
Salt Lake City - Cincinnati  75 29.33  331.69  0  1681  2142.92 1449  3162 
a Sample size of products (itinerary-airline combination) in the particular market. 
b The percentage of the sample of products for which the origin airport is a hub. 
 
For example, the table shows that of the 111 products in our sample for the Atlanta
to Dallas market, Atlanta is a hub for 33.33% of them (hub products).11 As discussed
in the introduction, the hub-and-spoke network is one of the major developments in
the airline industry since deregulation. Hub products may oﬀer more convenient
ﬂight schedules since airlines normally ﬂy to a wider range of destinations from their
hub airport. As such, the empirical model should capture this non-price component
of products as this is likely to inﬂuence passengers’ choice behavior among alternative
products. The fourth, ﬁfth and sixth columns summarize data on airfares. We can
see that, within a market, the minimum airfare for a ticket is zero dollars. These
tickets are likely associated with passengers using their accumulated frequent ﬂyer
miles to oﬀs e tt i c k e tp r i c e . 12 The seventh, eighth and ninth columns summarize data
on distances ﬂo w ni ne a c hm a r k e t .
Given that the ticket purchase data discussed above does not have passenger-
speciﬁc information, such as a passengers’ income or age, I use information on the
11Products oﬀered by Delta Airlines would be part of this 33.33% since Atlanta is a major hub
for Delta, while products oﬀered by American Airlines in this market would not be included in the
33.33% since Atlanta is not a hub for American.
12Unfortunately, the data does not contain information that allows me to distinguish between
tickets that were bought with frequent ﬂyer miles. I can only observe the actual price paid for each
ticket and conjecture that tickets with an unusually low price are either associated with frequent ﬂyer
or some other promotional program. In either case, I would not want to throw out these observations
since they may contain useful information about the non-price component of an airline’s products.
As you will see in the results section, I use the empirical model to disentangle the price and non-price
product components that inﬂuence passengers’ choice behavior.
12distribution of demographic data in the origin city to account for taste heterogeneity
in travel demand. As such, estimating equation (9) requires supplementing the
ticket purchase data with demographic data drawn from the origin city’s population
in each market.13 These demographic data are drawn from the 2001 and 2002 Current
Population Survey (CPS) published by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Tables
2A and 2B summarize the demographic
Table 2A  
Summary of Demographic Data 
   Age 
Atl- 
anta 












>80  Total 
  Income < $300  27  37  25  21  10  5  2  0  127 
 $300  to  $599  9  112  95  71  40  9  0  1  337 
  $600  to  $899  2 79 64 65 43 6  1  0 260 
  $900  to  $1199 0 34 50 31 22 1  1  0 139 
  $1200  to  $1499  0 8 23  13 8 0 0 0 52 
  $1500  to  $1799  0 7 11  10 8 0 0 0 36 
  $1800  or  more 0 4 19  18 8 0 0 0 49 
  Total 38  281  287  229  139  21  4  1  1,000 
Cinc- 
innati 
             
  Income < $300  26  51  26  21  23  10  8  1  166 
  $300  to  $599  16  108  85 76 58  18 3  0 364 
  $600  to  $899  3 35 71 70 48 6  1  0 234 
  $900  to  $1199 0 10 36 43 23 5  0  0 117 
  $1200  to  $1499  0 7 12  19 9 0 0 0 47 
  $1500  to  $1799  0 2  9 10 9 0 0 0 30 
  $1800 or more  0  4  13  15  10  0  0  0  42 
  Total 45  217  252  254  180  39  12  1  1,000 
Dallas               
  Income < $300  36  49  39  27  6  5  1  1  164 
  $300 to $599  17  101  99  71  36  7  1  0  332 
  $600  to  $899  3 66 69 50 31 4  0  0 223 
  $900  to  $1199 0 22 42 21 20 5  1  0 111 
  $1200  to  $1499  0 7 24  20 8 1 0 0 60 
  $1500  to  $1799  0 4 11  16 5 0 0 0 36 
  $1800 or more  0  9  29  23  11  2  0  0  74 
  Total 56  258  313  228  117  24  3  1  1,000 
Notes: The income variable is weekly income.  Numbers in matrix refer to number of individuals in 
the income-age category. 
13This non-parametric approach to model consumer heterogeniety is explained in more detail in
Nevo(2000).
13Table 2B  
Summary of Demographic Data 
   Age 
Hous- 
ton 












>80  Total 
  Income  <  $300  33 50  38 29 14 10  2  0 176 
  $300 to $599  17  122  103  83  42  13  1  0  381 
  $600 to $899  2  44  77  65  27  3  0  0  218 
  $900 to $1199  1  22  19  21  22  1  1  1  88 
  $1200 to $1499  0  13  22  25  4  0  0  1  65 
  $1500 to $1799  0  2  8  14  4  1  0  0  29 
  $1800 or more  0  4  3  23  10  3  0  0  43 
  Total 53  257  270  260  123  31  4  2  1,000 
Minne- 
apolis 
            
  Income  <  $300  38 29  21 19 10 12  6  0 135 
  $300 to $599  13  87  63  69  22  8  5  1  268 
  $600 to $899  5  58  76  67  38  9  0  0  253 
  $900 to $1199  0  20  57  50  36  2  0  0  165 
  $1200 to $1499  0  11  25  24  14  4  0  0  78 
  $1500 to $1799  0  3  10  13  12  1  0  0  39 
  $1800 or more  0  1  19  27  13  2  0  0  62 




            
  Income  <  $300  66 56  32 27 17 12  1  0 211 
  $300  to  $599  25 116 81 61 42 18  1  2 346 
  $600 to $899  0  56  77  73  22  7  1  0  236 
  $900 to $1199  0  17  31  29  25  8  1  0  111 
  $1200 to $1499  0  3  18  12  11  2  0  0  46 
  $1500  to  $1799 0 3  6 7 3 3 0 0 22 
  $1800  or  more  0 3  7 7 5 6 0 0 28 
  Total 91  254  252  216  125  56  4  2  1,000 
Notes: The income variable is weekly income.  Numbers in matrix refer to number of individuals in the 
income-age category. 
data in each origin city. A random sample of one thousand individuals is drawn
from each origin city’s population. From the samples drawn, we can see that there
is some diversity within each city. For example, while the majority of the sample
between ages 21 and 40 have weekly income below $1,200, quite a few people in this
age group earn above $1,200 per week. Further, most individuals above the age of
60 have income below $1,200 per week. When faced with the same set of options,
it is likely that these distinct groups of potential passengers may make diﬀerent
product choices. One reason is that they may have diﬀerent tastes over prices and
ﬂight schedule convenience. The empirical model is designed to account for such
passenger heterogeneity.
5R e s u l t s .
Recall that non-price product characteristics are captured by xjt and dj [see equation(1)],
where the researcher can observe variables in xjt but not dj. However, passengers and
14airlines both observe xjt and dj.T h e v a r i a b l e s i n xjt are “Hub”, “Hub×Distance”,
and “Distance×Market t”, all of which are explained below. The dj are product
ﬁxed eﬀects capturing product characteristics that are the same across markets. As
discussed above, these unobserved product characteristics may include, but not re-
stricted to, the quality of in-ﬂight service, and frequent ﬂyer programs oﬀered by
each airline. Including airline dummies in the estimation is suﬃcient to control for
dj. First, I estimate the mixed logit model (equation (9)) using pjt and xjt as the
independent variables. These results are displayed in table 3.14 I then re-estimate
the model using pjt, xjt and a full set of airline dummies as independent variables.
The results when airline dummies are included in the estimation are displayed in
table 4. A comparison of the results across both tables has implications for the
importance of price competition after controlling for unobservable non-price product
characteristics. Results in table 3 are discussed ﬁrst, then I compare and discuss the
results in table 4.
First, let us discuss the impact of airfare on potential passengers’ choice of prod-
ucts. Airfare is represented by the variable “Price”. As expected, the coeﬃcient
on “Price” is negative, indicating that an airline can increase the probability that
potential passengers will choose it’s ﬂi g h ti t i n e r a r yb yl o w e r i n gt h ea i r f a r eo nt h e
said itinerary, ceteris paribus.T h u s , t h e c o e ﬃcient estimate on “Price” in table 3
does suggest that price matters in competition among airlines.
14The coeﬃcients in table 3 correspond to the parameters in equation(9) as follows. α is the coeﬃ-
cient on “Price”. The parameter vector β corresponds to the coeﬃcients on “Hub”, “Hub×Distance”,
“Distance×Market t”f o rt =1 ,2,...,15.T h e p a r a m e t e r s i n t h e Σ matrix correspond to the coeﬃ-
cients in the column labeled “Standard Deviations”. The parameters in the Γ matrix correspond to
the coeﬃcients in the last three columns labeled, “Age”, “Income”, and “(Income)
2”.
15Table 3 
Results For Mixed Logit Model 
(Airline fixed effects not Included) 
Interactions with Demographic Variables:
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Hub×Distance -0.28* 
(0.17) 






      
Distance×Market 2  -3.24** 
(1.35) 
      
Distance×Market 3  -3.17** 
(0.76) 
      
Distance×Market 4  -4.56** 
(0.72) 
      
Distance×Market 5  -8.14** 
(1.24) 
      
Distance×Market 6  -4.64** 
(0.76) 
      
Distance×Market 7  -5.52** 
(0.82) 
      
Distance×Market 8  -7.62** 
(0.96) 
      
Distance×Market 9  -8.05** 
(0.92) 
      
Distance×Market 10  -6.76** 
(0.82) 
      
Distance×Market 11  -7.25** 
(1.04) 
      
Distance×Market 12  -6.04** 
(0.81) 
      
Distance×Market 13  -6.41** 
(0.85) 
      
Distance×Market 14  -2.36** 
(0.75) 
      
Distance×Market 15  -4.62** 
(0.81) 
      
 
GMM Objective  
    
369.82 
  
Number of observations is 1,462.  Standard errors are in parentheses. ** indicates statistical 
significance at the 5% level, while * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level. 
Next I turn to the impact that non-price product characteristics, captured by
the vector xjt, have on potential passengers’ choice of products. One non-price
characteristic that I do observe is whether or not the origin airport is a hub for the
airline oﬀering the product. Two possible reasons why passengers are more likely
to choose itineraries oﬀered by hub airlines are: (1) ﬂight schedules oﬀered by hub
airlines may be more convenient (fewer intermediate stops), (2) it is more likely that
passengers have frequent ﬂyer membership with a hub airline.15 The variable “Hub”
is a dummy variable taking the value one if the product is oﬀered by an airline that
15See Proussaloglou and Koppelman (1995), Berry (1990), Schumann (1986).
16has a hub at the origin airport and zero otherwise. The coeﬃcient on “Hub” is
positive, indicating that potential passengers are more likely to choose itineraries
where the origin airport is a hub for the airline oﬀering the itinerary. In other words,
airlines have a strategic advantage at their hub airports compared to their non-hub
competitors.
Another non-price characteristic that inﬂuences passengers’ choice of products is
the convenience of ﬂight schedule embodied in the itinerary. I measure the conve-
nience of a schedule by the actual distance ﬂown in getting from the origin to the
destination airport.16 The actual distance ﬂown to get to a destination from a speciﬁc
origin may vary since itineraries do not always involve direct ﬂights from the origin
to the destination. For example, in the market where Kansas City is the origin and
San Diego is the destination, an itinerary which has one intermediate stop in Chicago
involves ﬂying a longer distance compared to an itinerary with one intermediate stop
in Phoenix. Note however that even though both itineraries involve one intermediate
stop, they may diﬀer in terms of distance ﬂown. I associate shorter distances with
more convenient schedules. A direct ﬂight from Kansas City to San Diego would
involve the shortest possible distance in this market and thus interpreted as the most
convenient schedule in the said market. The variables in table 3 that capture this
measure of schedule convenience are the interactions between “Distance” and “Mar-
ket”. The variables “Market” are dummies taking the value one if the product is
in the relevant market and zero otherwise. The coeﬃcients on the interactions be-
tween “Distance” and “Market” dummies are negative, indicating that within a given
market (origin-destination combination), passengers prefer to choose ﬂight itineraries
that cover shorter distances, ceteris paribus.
16Subject to the availability of detailed data, we may measure the convenience of ﬂight schedules
in several ways. For example, information on departures and arrival times allows the researcher to
compute total layover time associated with each itinerary. A second alternative to measure schedule
convenience is to use a count of the number of intermediate stops associated with each itinerary.
Third, the researcher could use the actual distance ﬂown on each itinerary in a given market. I opt
to use the actual distance ﬂown as a measure of schedule convenience since it is arguably a superior
measure compared to number of intermediate stops (see discussion in text) and I did not have data
on arrival and departure times for each itinerary which rules out using layover times.
17The coeﬃcient on the interaction between “Hub” and “Distance” also uncovers
an interesting result. This coeﬃcient is negative, indicating that passengers are more
likely to choose hub products that have the shortest possible distance. Even more
important, it reveals that passengers are more sensitive to distance ﬂown (schedule
convenience) for hub products compared to non-hub products. In other words, pas-
sengers may expect hub itineraries to involve shorter distances (be more convenient)
and thus hub itineraries involving longer distances (less convenient) are more heavily
penalized compared to non-hub itineraries with equivalently long distances.
It is well known that consumers are heterogenous with respect to their taste for
various characteristics of diﬀerentiated products. As such, diversity in tastes often
leads to diversity in products oﬀered and purchased. Accounting for heterogeneity in
taste is at the heart of the mixed logit model [see BLP, Nevo(2000)]. Since consumers’
tastes are unobserved by the researcher, heterogeneity in tastes are often captured
by parametric assumptions along with non-parametric treatment of demographic in-
formation.17 Demographic information such as age and income are likely to be
correlated with taste and thus may explain consumers’ choice of diﬀerentiated prod-
ucts. Since air travel is a diﬀerentiated product industry, demographic information
may be able to explain the choices that potential passengers with a speciﬁcd e m o -
graphic proﬁle may make. I now turn to the task of discussing how demographics
of potential passengers in the relevant market might inﬂuence their air travel choice
behavior.
While the coeﬃcient on the interaction between “Distance” and “Age” is not sta-
tistically diﬀerent from zero, the coeﬃcient on the interaction between “Distance” and
“Income” is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests that higher income
passengers are more likely to choose itineraries covering shorter distances. Since
itineraries that cover shorter distances for a given origin-destination combination are
expected to be more expensive, we should expect that higher income passengers are
17Detail on how passengers’ heterogeniety is modeled in this paper is given in section 2. Speciﬁcally,
see equations (2), (4 ) and (8 ).
18more likely to choose these itineraries compared to lower income passengers. The
result is also consistent with the idea that higher income passengers have a higher
opportunity cost of time and thus more willing to pay a higher price for an itinerary
that has a more convenient travel schedule.
While the coeﬃcient on the interaction between “Price” and “Income” is statis-
tically diﬀerent from zero at conventional levels of signiﬁcance, the coeﬃcient on the
interaction between “Price” and “(Income)2”i sn o t . A s s u m i n gt h e yw e r eb o t hs t a t i s -
tically diﬀerent from zero, their sign pattern would suggest the intuitively-appealing
result that at relatively low levels of income, consumers become more price sensitive
as income increases, but after some point, price sensitivity fall with further increases
in income. However, since only the former coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant, we
have the troubling result that higher income passengers are more price sensitive.18
Having completed the discussion of the results in table 3 where airline dummies
are not included in the estimation, I now turn to results in table 4 where airline
dummies are included in the estimation though not reported in the table. The
crucial result that distinguishes table 4 from table 3 is the statistical insigniﬁcance
of the “Price” variable in table 4. It is also notable that the coeﬃcient on “Price” in
table 4 is signiﬁcantly smaller in absolute terms compared to its size in table 3. In
summary, when we control for airline ﬁxed eﬀects, which capture
18It may be that higher income passengers are likely to take more vacation trips. Consumers are
likely to be more price sensitive when purchasing itineraries for vacation travel. Brueckner, Dyer,
and Spiller (1992) found that airfares are lower on tourist routes relative to other routes, presumably
because travel demand is more price elastic on tourist routes.
19Table 4 
Results For Mixed Logit Model 
(Airline fixed effects Included) 
Interactions with Demographic Variables:
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Hub×Distance -0.48* 
(0.26) 






      
Distance×Market 2  -0.68 
(0.67) 
      
Distance×Market 3  -1.13* 
(0.64) 
      
Distance×Market 4  -1.50 
(1.06) 
      
Distance×Market 5  -3.33* 
(1.98) 
      
Distance×Market 6  -1.36* 
(1.06) 
      
Distance×Market 7  -1.84 
(1.54) 
      
Distance×Market 8  -3.56** 
(1.54) 
      
Distance×Market 9  -3.74** 
(1.91) 
      
Distance×Market 10  -3.10** 
(1.57) 
      
Distance×Market 11  -3.28* 
(1.68) 
      
Distance×Market 12  -2.73* 
(1.47) 
      
Distance×Market 13  -2.57 
(1.67) 
      
Distance×Market 14  -0.56 
(0.66) 
      
Distance×Market 15  -1.24 
(1.19) 
      
 
GMM Objective  
    
82.55 
  
Number of observations is 1,462.  Standard errors are in parentheses. ** indicates statistical 
significance at the 5% level, while * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level. 
unobserved19 diﬀerences in full service packages across airlines, price becomes less
important in explaining passengers’ choice between ﬂight itineraries oﬀered by various
airlines. A chi-square test of the restriction between the models in tables 3 and
4 rejects the null hypothesis that the restriction is insigniﬁcant.20 This further
19Again, I want to emphasize that full service packages oﬀered by airlines are most likely observed
by or known to potential passengers before they choose among alternative products. However, the
researcher does not observe all the dimensions of the service oﬀered by these airlines.
20This chi-square test is atributed to Newey and West(1987). It posits that (n · qr − n · qur)
d −→
χ
2[J], where n is the sample size, qr is the value of the GMM objective for the restricted model,
qur is the value of the GMM objective for the unrestricted model, and J is the number of pa-
rameter restrictions. In this case J =1 1since there are eleven dummies, one for each airline.
(n · qr − n · qur) = 419988.74 while the critical χ
2 value at the 95% level of signiﬁcance with eleven
degrees of freedom is 19.68.
20suggests that non-price characteristics of travel service oﬀered by airlines are crucial
in explaining passengers’ choice of these services. It is also worth mentioning that
the observable non-price product characteristics still have some explanatory power,
even though somewhat reduced, after unobservable diﬀerences in full service packages
across airlines are controlled for.
6C o n c l u s i o n .
This paper illustrates the relative importance of price and non-price product char-
acteristics in inﬂuencing potential passengers’ choice of products oﬀered by airlines.
The results suggest that, on average, prices may not be as important as we think
in explaining passengers’ choice behavior among alternative products. Non-price
product characteristics such as whether or not the product is oﬀered by a hub airline,
convenience of ﬂight schedules, and diﬀerences in other services oﬀered by airlines
which may include quality of in-ﬂight service and frequent ﬂyer programs, are likely
to do a better job of explaining passengers’ choice behavior.
The ﬁndings have implications for applying antitrust policy to the airline industry
since these policies are often concerned primarily with the potential price eﬀect of
proposed business decisions of airlines such as mergers and alliances. If the objective
of policies is to improve or prevent the decline in welfare, then non-price product
characteristics of products oﬀered by airlines seem to have a larger impact on welfare
compared to price. In other words, policy makers may want to focus on the impact
that mergers, alliances, or any other business decisions have on the non-price product
characteristics oﬀered by airlines. For example, we may want to know how mergers
and alliances aﬀect the convenience of ﬂight schedules oﬀered,21 or the impact on the
21R i c h a r d( 2 0 0 3 )d i da ne x c e l l e n tj o be s t i m a t i n gt h ei m p a c to fm e r g e r so nﬂight frequency. He
shows that airline mergers, while causing prices to increase, also leads to increases in ﬂight frequency
which may result in net increases in consumer surplus. Previous research almost exclusively focus
on the price and resulting welfare eﬀects of airline mergers [ see Borenstein (1990), Kim and Singal
(1993), Werden et al. (1991), Brueckner et al. (1992), Morrison (1996)]. Papers by Brueckner
(2001), Brueckner and Whalen (2000), and Bamberger et al. (2000) provide excellent analyses of the
eﬀects of airline alliances on airfare.
21value of frequent ﬂyer programs to passengers.22 One direction that future research
may take is to assess the impact that mergers and alliances have on various non-price
product characteristics of products oﬀered by airlines.
22Airline alliances often allow passengers to accumulate frequent ﬂyer miles accross alliance part-
ners. This is likely to improve the value of frequent ﬂyer programs to passengers.
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